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Stevenson: Broadening Arranger Liability Under Alaska State Law: The Ninth C

2006]
BROADENING ARRANGER LIABILITY UNDER ALASKA STATE
LAW: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION
OF BERG v. POPHAM

I.

INTRODUCTION

The prospect of defining "arranger liability" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) 1 has haunted courts since CERCLA's enactment in
1980.2 Congress passed CERCLA during the closing days of the
Carter Administration in a "sweeping" effort to clean up hazardous
waste sites. 3 CERCLA authorized the creation of a superfund to pay
for cleanup efforts, financed by a combination of taxes, appropriations and legal judgments against offending parties. 4 CERCLA also
authorized a strict liability cause of action against a potentially responsible party (PRP), compelling PRPs to contribute to their share
of the cleanup. 5 Parties found to have "arranged for" hazardous

1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. See, e.g., Roger K Ferland & Marilyn D. Cage, Using RCRA to Interpret CERCLA Liability: What is "ArrangingforDisposal"', 23 Ajuz. ST. L.J. 445, 445-46 (1991)
(noting difficulty federal courts have had in defining "arranger liability" under
CERCLA); Gregory A. Robins, Note, Catellus Development Corporation v. United
States: A "Solid" Approach to CERCLA "Arranger"Liability, or a "Waste" of Natural Resources?, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 189, 189-90 (1995) (noting "inscrutability" of statute).
Arranger status is one of four classifications of liability under CERCLA section
9607(a). The other theories of liability include current owner or operator, former
owner or operator, or transporters of a hazardous substance. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1), (2), (4). For a more in-depth discussion of CERCLA's liability
scheme in general, see infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
3. See Berg v. Popham, 113 P.3d 604, 608 (Alaska 2005) (Berg 1) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion), rev'd on
other grounds-, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996)) (noting Supreme
Court's and federal courts' acknowledgement of congressional intent for CERCLA's broad remedial authority).
4. See David W. Lannetti, Note, "ArrangerLiability" Under the ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA):JudicialRetreatfrom Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 279, 282, 282 n.10 (1998) (noting CERCLA's
two-fold purpose). Lannetti notes: "CERCLA authorized EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites and created a 'Superfund' with which to fund its activities." See id. at
283.
5. See Martina E. Cartwright, CERCLA at 25: A Retrospective, Introspective, and
ProspectiveLook at the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability
Act on Its 25th Anniversary, 18 TUL. ENVI-L. L.J. 299, 306 (2005) (noting standard of
liability).
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waste disposal are subject to arranger liability under CERCIA and
6
its state statutory counterparts.
Commentators continually note that judicial interpretation of
arranger liability has been inconsistent at best, as CERCLA's legislative history and CERCLA itself, offer limited guidance. 7 Statutory
interpretation is especially difficult when a state's version of CERCLA is drafted with minute differences, forcing state and federal
courts to rely not only on porous federal precedent, but state legislative intent as well. 8 Regardless, a court's broad interpretation of a
state's CERCLA provisions, in accordance with legislative intent, is a
positive step in cost recovery, especially in light of the seemingly
dark fate of CERCLA's taxing power and America's dubious future
as a global environmental leader. 9
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3) (assigning arranger liability). This section of
CERCLA holds liable:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances.
See id. See also ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822(a) (4) (2004) (assigning arranger liability).
Alaska's CERCLA counterpart dictates:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by the person,
other than domestic sewage, or by any other party or entity, at any facility or
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing hazardous substances, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
that causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance
is liable for costs of "response, containment, removal or remedial action ... resulting from an unpermitted release of a hazardous substance. . ... " See id. (emphasis
supplied).
7. See Ferland & Cage, supra note 2, at 445-46 (noting vagueness of language);
Robins, supra note 2, at 189-90 (highlighting Congress's failure to define "arrange"). See also Anna Marple Buboise, Comment, Expanding the Scope of Arranger
Liability Under CERCLA, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 469, 469 (1995) (discussing CERCLA's
vagueness and ambiguity).
8. See, e.g., Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berg I)
(explaining difference in statutory construction between CERCLA and Alaska
counterpart); Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 609 & nn.25-26 (looking to Alaska legislative
intent).
Throughout this Note, Berg II will refer to the Ninth Circuit's most recent
opinion of this case, while Berg Iwill refer to the Alaska Supreme Court's decision,
on which the Ninth Circuit relied in its ruling.
9. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 300 & n.5 (citation omitted) (explaining
CERCLA's taxing authority expired in 1995 and Superfund trust "ran out of
money" in 2003); id. at 322 (noting failed attempts in Congress to reauthorize
CERCLA's taxing ability); Felicity Barringer, United States Ranks 28th on Environment, a New Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A3 (discussing pilot study ranking 133 nations on environmental management). See also Daniel C. Esty, Stepping
Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 FoIDHAM ENVWL. L.J. 103 passim (1996)
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For example, in June 2005, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
Alaska Supreme Court's interpretation of Alaska's arranger liability
provision, which is broader than CERCLA's.' 0 In Berg v. Popham
(Berg I]),11 the Ninth Circuit ruled that when an entity manufactures or sells a useful product, although designed or installed properly but still releases a hazardous substance, that entity can become
a PRP under Alaska's arranger liability provision. 12 In Berg II, the
Maytag Corporation's predecessor in interest (Norge) designed
and installed a water separator system for the Berg family's small
dry-cleaning business.' 3 Even when used properly, the system allegedly released a hazardous substance into the sewer system. 14 The
Ninth Circuit ruled these allegations were sufficient to state a claim
for arranger liability under Alaska's CERCLA counterpart (Alaska
Statute). 15 This interpretation is broader than previous Ninth Circuit applications of arranger liability under CERCLA, and it is
based in part on the Alaska Statute's syntactic construction as well
16
as the Alaska Legislature's intent.
This Note explores the implications of the Ninth Circuit's acceptance of a broad reading of Alaska's arranger liability provision
at this moment in the doctrine's unsettled history. Part II sets forth
the pertinent facts of the Berg II opinion. 17 Part III considers CERCLA's legislative and case history and highlights the issues surrounding arranger liability generally.18 Part IV offers a narrative
analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Berg II opinion, and Part V critically
analyzes that decision.' 9 Part VI questions the impact this broader
(calling for creation of "international regime" to promote global environmental
sustainability).
10. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1130 (accepting Alaska Supreme Court's interpretation of arranger liability in that state).
11. 412 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2005).
12. See id. at 1130 (providing holding of case). For relevant Alaska statutory
language, see supra note 6.
13. See id. at 1124-25 (explaining background facts).
14. See id. (explaining background facts).
15. See id. at 1130 (stating holding of case).
16. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1125-28 (quoting Berg I, 113 P.3d 604, 608-09
(Alaska 2005)) (discussing differences between CERCLA and Alaska Statute's arranger liability provisions). Compare 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (2000) (outlining four
classifications of liability) with ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.822(a) (2004) (offering five
classifications of liability).
17. For a full discussion of the facts, see infra notes 23-48 and accompanying
text (providing facts of Berg I and Berg I).
18. For a full background discussion, see infra notes 49-196 and accompanying text (discussing background on CERCLA and relevant federal and state case
law).
19. For a narrative analysis of Berg II, see infra notes 197-269 and accompanying text (presenting narrative analysis of Ninth Circuit's opinion in Berg I). For a
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interpretation may have on other state and federal decisions, especially considering a persuasive case source for the Berg II decision
20
has since been overturned.
Finally, this Note encourages states to adopt a broad standard
for arranger liability for two reasons. First, CERCLA's taxing authority expired in 1995, and it is unlikely to be revived in the foreseeable future. 21 Second, to maintain its position as a global leader,
the United States should provide emerging economies with a posi22
tive model for environmental management.
II.

FACTS

In Berg I, David and Marge Berg owned and operated a drycleaning business (Boni-Park) in Anchorage, Alaska from 1972 to
1978 and again from 1980 to 1983.23 Boni-Park was a franchise operation of the Norge Corporation, defendant Maytag's predecessor
in interest. 24 The Bergs purchased dry-cleaning equipment from
Norge prior to 1972, and Norge suggested the Bergs use
percholoroethylene (PCE) in the dry-cleaning process. 25 Also
known as tetrachloroethylene, PCE is a synthetic cleaning agent
26
used by eighty-five percent of dry cleaners in the United States.
critical analysis of Berg II, see infra notes 270-309 and accompanying text (providing critical analysis of Ninth Circuit's opinion in Berg fl).
20. For a discussion of the impact of Berg II, see infra notes 310-26 and accompanying text (considering impact of Berg 11). See also R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v.
Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 81 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App. 2001) (Street 1), rev'd, 166 S.W.3d
232, 255 (Tex. 2005) (Street I).
21. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 300 (noting questionable fate of CERCLA's
taxing provision). Cartwright also notes the trust funding clean up was depleted in
2003. See id.
22. See, e.g., Andrew Rice & Terrence L. Bracy, InternationalDevelopment, COALITION FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ABROAD,

Aug. 6, 2002, http://www.colead.org/

WP%20Section%203.html (noting America's role in international environmental
development and management) (on file with author).
23. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d 604, 605-06 (Alaska 2005) (providing background
facts). In 1978, the Bergs sold the business to the Pophams, then reacquired BoniPark from the Pophams in 1980. See id. The Bergs then sold Boni-Park for a second time, to the Jaegers, in 1983. See id. at 606.
24. See id. (introducing background facts); Berg 11, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 n.2
(9th Cir. 2005) (specifying claims of PRP Maytag). The opinion explains: "Maytag
denies that it is Norge's corporate successor and reserves the right to litigate this
issue at trial." See id. For "purposes of reviewing the merits of its motion to dismiss
and motion for judgment on the pleadings, Maytag does not dispute it is Norge's
successor in interest." See id.
25. See Berg I, 412 F.3d at 1124-25 (providing background facts).
26. See TODD CAMPBELL & LoRi Low, COALITION FOR CLEAN AIR, HUNG OUT
TO DRY: How THE USE OF PERCHLOROETHYLENE IN DRY CLEANING ENDANGERS YOU
AND YOUR FAMILY'S HEALTH 2 (Oct. 2002), http://www.coalitionforcleanair.org/
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PCE is a carcinogen that causes skin irritation and respiratory
27
complications.
Norge designed and installed the Bergs' dry-cleaning equipment. 28 Norge also installed a separator system to separate water
from the PCE. 29 During the dry-cleaning process, water and PCE
were mixed.30 Ultimately, the separator system recaptured the
PCE, and the remaining water flowed into the sewer.3 1 According
to the Bergs' second amended complaint, this system "'facilitated
spillage, leakage, and direction of [PCE] into the city sewer system."13 2 Periodically, the Bergs also used a vaporization process to
remove any oil or dirt from the system that may have gathered during the PCE separation process. 3 3 The vaporization process produced a sludge contaminated with PCE, which was also directed
34
into the sewer.
In 1991, Alaska highway construction workers detected traces
of PCE in the soil near Boni-Park. 35 Pursuant to the Alaska Statute,
the state issued liens on the Bergs' assets to help create a pool of
funds for cleaning up the PCE. 36 The Bergs were subject to strict
liability under the Alaska Statute, which permits the state to seek
damages from a party responsible for "'an unpermitted release of a
hazardous substance."13 7 The Alaska Statute also permits a liable
pdf/reports/cca-reports-hung-out-to-dry.pdf (citation omitted) (discussing hazards
of PCE).

27. See id. at 5 (noting hazards of PCE). Exposure to PCE also causes "drying
or cracking of the skin; irritation of the skin, eyes, nose, mouth, throat and lungs;
bums, headaches, dizziness, lightheadedness, nausea, vomiting, fainting, coughing, fluid build up in the lungs; damage to the central nervous system, kidneys,
liver and reproductive system." See id. Greenpeace reported in 2001 that "[PCE] is
found in more than 50 percent of the Superfund sites in the country and 70 percent of all [PCE] used ends up in the environment." See id. at 6 (citation omitted).
28. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1125 (providing background facts).
29. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 606 (providing background facts).

30. See id. (explaining dry-cleaning process and separator system).
31. See id. (explaining separator system).

32. See id. (quoting Bergs' second amended complaint).
33. See id. (elaborating vaporization and disposal processes).
34. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 606 (explaining vaporization process).
35. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1125 (noting state's discovery of PCE). There is a

factual discrepancy between Berg I and Berg II. Berg I states Alaska discovered PCE
in soil near Boni-Park in 1987 or 1988. Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 606.
36. See BergII, 412 F.3d at 1125 (describing Alaska's initiation of decontamination efforts). See also Berg I, 113 P.3d at 606-07 (explaining procedural background
of case); infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska Statute's recovery provisions).
37. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1125 (citing AiSKA STAT. § 46.03.822(a) (2004))
(discussing liability).
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party to seek contribution from any other liable party. 38 The Bergs
allegedly paid over one million dollars for cleanup, and they even39
tually sought contribution from Maytag as a PRP.
Seeking contribution, the Bergs filed suit against Maytag under
the theory of arranger liability as promulgated by both CERCLA
and the Alaska Statute. 40 Maytag removed the case to federal district court, which granted in part Maytag's motion to dismiss, holding the CERCLA and Alaska Statute arranger liability provisions
inapplicable. 4 1 The Bergs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, not contesting CERCLA's inapplicability, but rather arguing the district
court incorrectly interpreted the Alaska Statute's arranger liability
42
provision.
Unable to find controlling Alaska precedent on the state's interpretation of arranger liability, the Ninth Circuit certified two
questions to the Alaska Supreme Court. 43 The two questions were:
first, does the inclusion of the disjunctive "or" before the phrase "by
any other party or entity" in the Alaska Statute, which is absent in
CERCLA, require ownership or possession of a hazardous substance, authority to control or a duty to dispose of the released hazardous substance, before an entity can be subject to arranger
liability as it would under CERCLA?44 Second, if not, may an entity
be subject to arranger liability under Alaska law if that entity "manufactures, sells, and installs a useful product that, when used as designed," releases a hazardous substance into the sewer? 45 The
Alaska Supreme Court answered the first question negatively and
the second question affirmatively. 4 6 Specifically, the court held an
entity need not own or possess a hazardous substance to be subject
to arranger liability in Alaska, provided that the entity was "actually
38. See id. (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.822(j)) (discussing contribution).
39. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 607 (providing background facts).
40. See id. (providing background facts); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3) (2000) (assigning arranger liability under federal legislation); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 46.03.822 (a) (4) (assigning arranger liability under state legislation). For a discussion of Norge and Maytag's legal relationship, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
41. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 607 (explaining procedural posture of case).
42. See id. (providing background facts).
43. See id. (presenting procedural posture). For a discussion of certified questions, see infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
44. See id. at 605 (reciting first certified question sent from Ninth Circuit).
See also supra note 6.
45. See id. (citation omitted) (reciting second certified question sent from
Ninth Circuit).
46. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 605 (finding Alaska legislature intended for Alaska
Statute to be more inclusive than CERCLA).
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involved" in the resulting hazardous spillage. 47 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Bergs alleged facts sufficient to support
48
their claim for arranger liability under the Alaska Statute.
III.

BACKGROUND

A. CERCLA: Background, Contribution and Liability
This section provides background on CERCLA generally, followed by a brief discussion of the 1986 contribution amendment
under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) .4 Then, a discussion of general liability under CERCLA
section 9607 addresses in detail the federal circuits' differing approaches to arranger liability.
1.

CERCLA Generally

Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 in response to the discovery
of hazardous waste sites and the ineffectiveness of then-existing legislation to manage their cleanup. 50 Congress, focusing on air and
water pollutants, enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) 51 in 1976, which inadequately provided remedial support to the newly-discovered problem of abandoned hazardous
52
waste sites.

Enacted after little debate, CERCLA granted the federal government greater power to recover cleanup costs from offending
47. See Berg 11, 412 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting actual involvement
approach used by Alaska Supreme Court in Berg ]); BergI, 113 P.3d at 610 (employing actual involvement approach).
48. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1129 (allowing claim to stand under actual involvement approach used by Alaska Supreme Court). The Ninth Circuit also upheld
the district court's ruling that the Bergs had no cause of action under the state law
theories of contribution, equitable apportionment or indemnity. See id. These
theories failed because the Bergs neglected to make the required allegations in
their complaints and also did not follow Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to these claims. See id. at 1129-30.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000) (authorizing right to contribution).
50. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 301-05 (citations omitted) (providing background for CERCLA's enactment). Love Canal was a small residential community
in upstate New York that was originally used in the 1940s as a toxic waste dump
site. See id. at 301. The discovery of Love Canal and similar sites around the country induced Congress to take remedial action. See id. at 302 & n.17. See H.R. REP.
No. 96-1016(I), at 17-21 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-23
[hereinafter House Report 1] (summarizing purpose of CERCLA and describing
characteristics common to abandoned hazardous waste sites).
51. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976),
amended by Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94
Stat. 2334 [hereinafter RCRA].
52. See House Report I,supra note 50, at 17-18, 22 (noting inadequacies of
RCRA in providing remedial support).
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parties; this power is authorized by the Act's liability provisions and
taxing mechanisms. 53 CERCLA provided the government with a
strict liability cause of action against those parties potentially responsible for contributing to hazardous waste sites. 5 4 Lawmakers
thought this provision would induce offenders to clean up inactive
waste sites voluntarily. 5 5 CERCLA also established a Superfund to
finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 5 6 This congressionally-mandated trust fund provides for emergency cleanup by taxing crude oil, certain chemicals and inorganic substances in the
event a PRP refused to pay. 57 While the taxing mechanism that fed

Superfund has expired, the government's ability to recover from
58
PRPs remains.
2.

Contribution Under SARA

Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 with SARA, which supplemented CERCLA by authorizing a private cause of action for contribution against liable or potentially liable third parties. 59 Under
53. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 305 (noting dual nature of funding).
54. See id. (citing James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous
Waste Policy in the 1980s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 355-57 (1986)) (citations omitted).
Mr. Florio noted that:
CERCLA established liability for the private parties who generated the
wastes found at a dump site, those who transported such wastes, and
those who owned and operated the dump. These liability provisions held
such parties strictly, jointly and severally liable for the costs of cleaning up
the site and permitted the federal government both to recover the funds
expended by the federal fund and to issue orders compelling private responsible parties to conduct such cleanups on their own.
See Florio, supra, at 356.
55. See House Report I, supra note 50, at 17 (providing purpose and summary of
CERCLA).

56. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 305 n.39 (citing Florio, supra note 54, at
355-57). Mr. Florio noted: "the law established a $1.6 billion trust fund, to be
funded over a period of five years primarily by taxes on the domestic production
and import of chemical 'feedstocks' - the basic chemical building blocks that are
used to manufacture most other chemical products." Florio, supra note 54, at 35556. Any emergency cleanup authorized by the EPA was funded by the trust. See
Cartwright, supra note 5, at 307-08. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1) (2000) (providing presidential authority to order cleanup).
57. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 308 (describing taxing scheme to finance
trust).
58. See id. at 315 (noting Superfund taxing authority expired on December
31, 1995 and has since remained inactive); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (setting forth
PRP liability).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1) (2000) (outlining contribution scheme) [hereinafter SARA]; Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 675 (3d Cir.
2003) (discussing history of CERCLA and SARA); H.R. REP. No. 99-253(l), at 79
(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861 [hereinafter House Report I1].
This section "clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly and sevenrally
[sic] liable under CERC[A to seek contribution from other potentially liable par-
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SARA, a party liable for cleanup can seek contribution from any
other liable party or PRP defined by CERCIA section 9607.60 Thus,
SARA permits private cost recovery in addition to the initial public
61
cost recovery scheme originally set forth in CERCLA.
3.

GeneralLiability under CERCLA section 9607

CERCLA classifies four types of PRPs under section 9607: (1)
the current owner and operator of a vessel or a facility; 62 (2) the

former owner or operator of a facility or vessel where a hazardous
substance was disposed; 63 (3) one who arrangedfor disposal'64 and (4)
transporters of a hazardous substance to a site of release or
threatened release. 65 Those found liable under one of these four
categories are strictly liable and, if the damage is indivisible, subject
66
to joint and several liability.

CERCLA's hurried passage contributed in part to its vague language and "sparse" legislative history, making it difficult for courts
to interpret many parts of CERCLA. 67 A notably difficult provision
to interpret is CERCLA's assignment of liability. 68 The language
used in assigning arranger liability is especially vague, and few definitions are available for internal cross-referencing. 69 The imprecision with which this section was written has forced courts to
decipher for themselves the meaning of arranger liability under
CERCLA, resulting in numerous interpretations that have been
ties, when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost
that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances." See id. See
also Cartwright, supra note 5, at 306 (noting prior to SARA, courts "recognized [the
right to contribution] as implied") (citations omitted).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (noting scope of contribution).
61. See, e.g., Morton Int'l, 343 F.3d at 675-76 (noting combined effects of CERCLA and SARA).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 960 7 (a)(1) (assigning liability to current owner or
operator).
63. See id. § 9607(a) (2) (assigning liability to former owner or operator).
64. See id. § 9607(a) (3) (assigning liability to arrangers).
65. See id. § 96 0 7(a) (4) (assigning liability to transporters).
66. See Robins, supra note 2, at 195 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d
160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988)); id. (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)) (discussing PRP liability).
67. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1, 1 (1982) (noting hurried passage of CERCLA); Ferland & Cage, supra note 2, at
445-46 (noting judicial frustration in discerning CERCLA's language).
68. See Ferland & Cage, supra note 2, at 446 (noting "inscrutability" of liability
provisions).
69. See id. at 447 (noting only three terms in section 9607(a) (3) are explicitly
defined).
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"both inconsistent and confusing." 70 The existence of a "useful
product exception," which exempts some sellers from arranger lia71
bility, further muddies the field.
a.

The Various Approaches to InterpretingArranger Liability

Federal and state courts have taken a variety of approaches
when contemplating arranger liability under CERCLA and its state
statutory counterparts. 72 When assigning arranger liability, courts
have generally taken two broad approaches: the first is based on a
PRP's level of intent, and the second is based on a PRP's control
over the hazardous substance or degree of actual involvement in
disposal. 73 More specific categorical approaches include: strict liability;74 specific intent; 75 totality of the circumstances; 76 obligation

to control; 77 and actual involvement. 78 This section will examine in
depth each of these categorical approaches.
1) Level of Intent
During the 1980s and 1990s, federal courts considering arranger liability often discussed whether PRPs met each jurisdic70. See id. (noting general judicial independence in defining "arranger
liability").
71. See Berg 1,113 P.3d 604, 610 (Alaska 2005). The useful product doctrine
exempts manufacturers from arranger liability when they do no more than sell a
useful, but hazardous, substance to end users. See id. (citations omitted). See also
infra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Lannetti, supra note 4, at 291 (noting three general approaches
adopted by modern courts in assigning arranger liability: strict liability; specific
intent; and totality of circumstances). For a discussion of these and other approaches, see infra notes 73-166 and accompanying text.
73. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 608 & n.20 (noting differences between circuits).
The Texas Supreme Court in Street II noted that most courts agree there must be a
"nexus" between disposal and a PRP's conduct. See Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 242.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding PRPs strictly liable).
75. See, e.g., Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting critical issue was meaning of "arranged for" in statute).
76. See, e.g., S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402 (lth Cir.
1996); United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996) (using
totality of circumstances approach to arranger liability).
77. See, e.g.,
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir.
2002); Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1451 (E.D. Cal.
1995) (using "obligation to control" approach to arranger liability).
78. See, e.g.,
BergII, 412 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005); BergI, 113 P.3d 604,
609 (Alaska 2005); Street I, 81 S.W.3d 276, 293 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting "actual
involvement" is factor in determining arranger liability).
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tion's required level of intent before assigning liability. 79 The
circuits differ, however, in which standard they apply. 80 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit imposes strict liability; the Seventh Circuit
requires specific intent, while the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits take a
81
totality of circumstances approach.
i.

Strict Liability in the Eighth Circuit

In the Eighth Circuit, little intent is required to trigger arranger liability. 82 Under the "Aceto Doctrine," strict liability is imposed on a PRP that maintains ownership over a substance even
without an intent to dispose.83 Specifically, in United States v. Aceto
Agricultural Chemicals Co. (Aceto) ,84 the Eighth Circuit held a PRP's
intention to dispose of a hazardous substance is not a prerequisite
to assigning arranger liability.8 5 To require such intent would "frustrate" CERCLA's goal of compelling those responsible to bear the
86
cost of cleanup.
In Aceto, after cleaning up a pesticide formulation company's
(Aidex) contaminated site, the United States and the state of Iowa
sought recovery costs from the manufacturing companies who
hired Aidex to transform their pesticide product from technical to
consumer grade. 8 7 The EPA and Iowa alleged the manufacturers
were subject to arranger liability under CERCLA and RCRA because the manufacturers maintained ownership over the pesticides
during the entire process and because the process inherently resulted in the production of hazardous waste. 88 The Eighth Circuit
79. See Lannetti, supra note 4, at 280 (recounting history of intent standards
used by federal courts).
80. See infra notes 81-120 and accompanying text.
81. See id. (noting circuits take different approaches).
82. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
More recently the Eighth Circuit has indicated it will determine arranger liability
based on a totality of circumstances test. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d
706, 721 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting court will not look to "bright-line rules," rather it
will look to facts of each case in "deciding questions of arranger liability"). Still,
the Eighth Circuit maintains that "control ... is not a necessary factor in every case
of arranger liability," particularly when a party's ownership of the hazardous substance is established. See id. at 720.
83. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384 (holding an arranger need not intend to dispose of hazardous substance).
84. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
85. See id. at 1380 (noting court of appeals rejected defendant's narrow interpretation of "arranger"). See also Lannetti, supra note 4, at 294-95 (noting effect of
Aceto decision on Ninth and Eleventh Circuits).
86. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380-81 (noting CERCLA's primary goals). See also
Lannetti, supra note 4, at 295 (discussing Aceto).
87. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375 (providing facts of case).
88. See id. at 1376 (noting allegations).
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held that arranging for disposal does not require intent to dispose
of a hazardous substance and concluded the governments' allegations were sufficient to subject the manufacturers to arranger
liability.

89

The Eighth Circuit distinguished Aceto from "useful product"
cases, where a manufacturer sells a hazardous substance to another
party who integrates the hazardous substance into the final product. 90 Unlike the useful product cases, where liability does not attach, a transfer of ownership never occurred in Aceto. 9 1 The
manufacturers in Aceto owned the pesticides while Aidex formu92
lated them.
ii.

Specific Intent in the Seventh Circuit

At the other end of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit requires
a PRP specifically intend to dispose of a hazardous substance before
assigning arranger liability.93 In Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex
Corp. (Amcast), 9 4 the Seventh Circuit held that carriers who spill
chemicals are liable under CERCLA, but the entity that ships the
chemicals are not. 95 In Amcast, a manufacturer (Elkhart) sought

contribution from one of its trichloroethylene (TCE) suppliers (Detrex), after Elkhart had to clean up chemicals Detrex and its hired
carrier (Transport Services) spilled while delivering TCE to Elkhart. 96 Writing for the court, Judge Posner reasoned that Detrex
hired Transport Services to move the TCE, not to spill it. 9 7 In other

words, Detrex did not specifically intend for Transport Services to
spill the TCE and therefore was not responsible for the spillage
from Transport Services's trucks. 98

Before the Seventh Circuit articulated its standard of specific
intent in Amcast, an Illinois district court held that chemical sellers
89. See id. at 1384 (providing holding of case). The Eighth Circuit held intent
is not required for liability to attach. See id. at 1380.
90. See id. at 1381 (noting distinctions between Aceto and useful product
cases). For a discussion of useful product cases, see infra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
91. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers
Corp., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4707 (D. Fla. 1988) and Edward Hines Lumber Co. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
92. See id. (applying reasoning to facts).
93. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) (requiring intent to dispose).
94. See id. (highlighting that no transfer of ownership occurred).
95. See id. at 747 (providing holding of case).
96. See id. at 747-48 (providing facts of case).
97. See id. at 751 (providing reasoning of case).
98. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751 (applying reasoning).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol17/iss2/6

12

Stevenson: Broadening Arranger Liability Under Alaska State Law: The Ninth C
2006]

BROADENING ARRANGER

LIABiLITy

were not subject to arranger liability when they sold chemicals
solely for another's wood treatment and not to dispose of the substances. 99 In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co. (Edward Hines),100 one of the sellers, Osmose, designed and installed
the chemical treatment apparatus in a client's plant. 10 1 The court
reasoned that even though Osmose may have known the treatment
run-off was being held in a reserve pond on the client's site, CER10 2
CLA liability was inappropriate.
Despite possibly knowing about the run-off pond at the treatment plant site, the sale of treatment chemicals without more did
not trigger arranger liability.' 0 3 In Edward Hines, the court did not
assign arranger liability because Osmose's sale of chemicals was for
wood treatment and not disposal. 10 4 Furthermore, Osmose did not
10 5
decide the chemicals' fate after treatment.
iii.

Totality of Circumstances:Eleventh and Sixth
Circuits

Between the extremes of strict liability and specific intent, the
Eleventh and Sixth Circuits employ a totality of circumstances
formula when considering arranger liability.1 0 6 In South Florida
Water Management District v. Montalvo (Montalvo),107 the Eleventh
Circuit took a totality of circumstances approach to determine the
existence of arranger liability. 10 8 There, a pesticide-formulating
and aerial spraying services company (Montalvo) asserted the landowners, to whom it provided service, arranged for disposal by virtue
99. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (providing holding of case).
100. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
101. See id. at 653 (providing facts of case).
102. See id. at 655 n.3 (noting "[tihe crucial inquiry" in determining arranger
liability is reason for transaction for hazardous substance).
103. See id. at 656 (applying facts to reasoning).
104. See id. at 656-57 (applying facts to reasoning).
105. See Edward Hines, 685 F. Supp. at 656-57 (applying facts to reasoning).
106. See Lannetti, supra note 4, at 280 (noting that after Aceto and Amcast,
"federal courts located in jurisdictions that previously had not ruled on the issue of
CERCLA arranger liability discovered two disparate approaches when consulting
appellate case law. This eventually led to the genesis of a third, middle-ground
approach involving a 'totality of the circumstances' assessment of each individual
case").
107. 84 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1996).
108. See id. at 407 (citations omitted) (taking totality of circumstances approach). The Eleventh Circuit emphasized "that whether or not a party has 'arranged for' the disposal of a hazardous substance depends on the particular facts
of each case." See id. at 409.
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of their contractual relationship. 0 9 The court ruled the landowners were not arrangers because they neither took any affirmative
action beyond the contracted-for service, nor was there an implicit
agreement for disposal. 1 0
The court noted the different factors courts generally consider
when assigning arranger liability."' These considerations include
whether there exists: the sale of a useful product; an intended disposal of a hazardous substance; or a "crucial decision" where to locate the hazardous materials." 2 Even under a totality of
circumstances approach, however, the court ruled that to be subject
to arranger liability the PRP must have had an affirmative role in
the disposal of the hazardous waste, which the landowners in Montalvo did not." 3
The Sixth Circuit also uses a totality of circumstances test, with
a specific emphasis on a PRP's intent to dispose of a hazardous substance. In United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc. (Cello-Foil),1 14 the
court held that the proper inquiry when assessing arranger liability
is "whether the [PRP] intended to enter into a transaction that included an 'arrangement for' the disposal of hazardous substances,"
and the court can infer the PRP's intent based on the totality of
circumstances." 15 In Cello-Foil, the government sought cleanup
costs from companies that purchased solvents from the Thomas
Solvent Company. 1 6 Thomas Solvent sold its product in large
drums so that purchasers, such as Cello-Foil, could return empty or
117
nearly empty drums to Thomas Solvent for a return deposit.
Thomas Solvent sometimes dumped the remaining solvents or the
solution used to wash returned drums on the ground, resulting in
ground-water contamination." 18
109. See id. at 404, 406-07 (providing facts of case).
110. See id. at 407-08 (distinguishing Aceto). The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Montalvo from Aceto based on the nature of the contracted for services. See
id. at 408-09. The "[l]andowners contracted to have pesticides applied to their
property. They did not agree to have pesticides and contaminated rinse water
spilled onto" the contaminated site. See id. at 407.
111. See id. at 406-07 (noting factors courts consider).
112. See Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 406-07 (listing factors courts consider).
113. See id. at 407 (citation omitted) (noting arranger must take affirmative
action in disposal).
114. 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996) (deciding proper test for determining arranger liability).
115. See id. at 1231 (providing framework for inquiry).
116. See id. at 1230 (providing facts of case).
117. See id. (discussing process of returning empty or nearly empty drums).
118. See id. (noting Thomas Solvent's method for emptying drums).
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In determining whether defendant purchasers "otherwise arranged for disposal," the Sixth Circuit considered whether the purchasers took any affirmative actions to dispose of the solvents,
which the court reasoned was in line with the Seventh Circuit's Amcast decision. 119 Ultimately, the court remanded the case because
genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant purchasers returned the drums to Thomas Solvent with the
120
additional purpose of disposal.
2) Level of Control or Involvement
Another general approach courts have taken is based on a
PRP's level of control over, or involvement in, the disposal of the
hazardous substance.' 2 1 Again, courts have formulated different
lines of inquiry within the broad category of control. 122 Specifically, the Second Circuit looks for a PRP's obligation to control the
hazardous waste disposal, and the Ninth Circuit must find a PRP's
23
ownership over or obligation to control the hazardous substance.'
Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court and an appeals court in Texas
have articulated an "actual involvement" standard.124 It should be
noted, however, that the Texas case has been overturned by the
25
state's supreme court.
i. Obligation to Control: Second and Ninth Circuits
Before assigning arranger liability, the Second Circuit requires
that a PRP have an obligation to control the disposal of the hazardous substance at issue. 126 In GeneralElectric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. (AAMCO) ,127 General Electric Company (G.E.) sought
contribution for waste oil cleanup from thirty service stations, as
well as the oil companies who owned the service stations. 12 8 G.E.
argued the oil companies had the opportunity to direct the service
119. See Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1232 (providing reasoning behind inquiry).
120. See id. at 1233-34 (discussing genuine issues of material fact).
121. See infra notes 126-66 and accompanying text.

122. See infra notes 126-66 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 126-52 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
125. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
126. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir.
1992) (noting PRP must have obligation to control disposal of hazardous substance as opposed to "mere ability or opportunity").
127. 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting need for nexus in finding liability).
128. See id. at 282-83 (providing facts of case). G.E. sought contribution after
it settled a previous case, agreeing to pay over $1.6 million in cleanup costs around
an upstate New York hazardous waste dump site. See id. at 282.
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stations on how to dispose of the oil waste, thus "otherwise arrang129
ing" for disposal.
The district court and the Second Circuit disagreed with G.E.,
finding the oil companies had neither ownership over the hazardous substances nor control of the process by which the oil waste was
generated.1 30 The Second Circuit held that arranger liability under
CERCLA depends not on the ability or opportunity to control the
disposal of the hazardous substance; rather, the PRP must have an
"obligation to exercise control over [the] hazardous waste disposal."1 31 The oil companies' mere ownership of the individual ser13 2
vice stations did not create such an obligation.
The Second Circuit further noted that when courts have assigned arranger liability to parties that were not actually involved in
the disposal, those courts have still found the obligatory nexus between the PRP and the disposal.1 3 3 The court in AAMCO concluded such a sufficient nexus between the service stations' disposal
13 4
and the oil companies was lacking.
Following AAMCO, a federal district court in California in
United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. (Iron Mountain)13 5 noted
that no court had ever imposed arranger liability on an entity that
"never owned or possessed, and never had any authority to control
or duty to dispose of, the hazardous materials at issue."13 6 In Iron
Mountain, the United States and California sought cleanup costs
from a northern California mine (Mine), and the Mine's owners
asserted counterclaims and third party claims against the United
States and California for contribution. 137 The Mine alleged that
the United States's damming of two waterways caused a build-up of
the hazardous substance that otherwise would have been diluted
and also alleged California was involved in managing the dam
projects.138
129. See id. at 286 (dismissing G.E.'s interpretation of arranger liability as too
broad).
130. See id. at 287-88 (providing holding).
131. See AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286 (emphasis in original) (noting nexus requirement).
132. See id. at 287 (discussing relationship between oil companies and service
stations).
133. See id. at 286 (citations omitted) (discussing consistent nexus requirement).
134. See id. at 287-88 (providing holding of case).
135. 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
136. See id. at 1451 (citing AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286) (noting plaintiff did not
allege the United States or California "owned or possessed" hazardous waste).
137. See id. at 1431 (discussing -facts of case).
138. See id. at 1435, 1436 (discussing facts of case).
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According to the court, the Mine did not allege facts sufficient
to find the United States or California subject to arranger liability. 13 9 The court distinguished cases where a party did not have
literal control or possession of the hazardous waste at the time of
the disposal but was still subject to arranger liability. 140 In those
cases, parties subject to arranger liability were either the "source of
the pollution or managed its disposal by the arranger." 14 1 The
court found the Mine's allegations insufficient to subject the
United States to arranger liability because the Mine did not aver the
federal government operated the Mine.1 42 Finally, neither the
United States nor California owned or possessed the mine waste, so
the court dismissed the arranger claims for failure to state a claim
143
upon which relief could be granted.
Seven years later, in United States v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell Oil),144
the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of Iron Mountain.1 45 In
Shell Oil, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the United States

was subject to arranger liability after it encouraged the production
and purchased increased amounts of aviation gas during World
War II. This gas created excessive hazardous waste, which was consequently dumped. 146 The United States brought suit against four
oil companies to recover costs incurred while cleaning up a Los
Angeles dump site. 147 Pursuant to a cross motion for summary
judgment, the district court followed the Aceto ownership test and
held the United States liable as an arranger. 148 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding the United States was not an arranger under
CERCLA section 9607 (a) (3).149

The Ninth Circuit distinguished Shell Oil from Aceto, concluding the United States in Shell Oil acted more like a purchaser than a
139. See id. At 1451-52 (dismissing arranger claims).
140. See Iron Mountain, 881 F. Supp. at 1451 (noting instances when courts
found arranger liability).
141. See id. (citing CadillacFairview/California,Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562
(9th Cir. 1994); CatellusDev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 1994);JonesHamilton v. Beazer Materials & Seros., 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ne. Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)) (distinguishing facts of Iron Mountain
from facts of these cases).
142. See id. at 1451 (noting insufficiency of complaint).
143. See id. at 1451-52 (dismissing arranger claims).
144. 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. See id. at 1058 (following Iron Mountain).
146. See id. at 1049-52 (discussing background facts).
147. See id. at 1048 (providing background facts).
148. See id. at 1055-56 (explaining district court's analysis).
149. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1062 (providing holding of case).
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manufacturer, having never owned the raw materials that were later

dumped. 150 In Shell Oil, the Ninth Circuit emphasized control as a
"crucial element" in determining arranger liability. 15 1 According to
the Ninth Circuit, the United States did not exercise sufficient con1 52
trol over the waste to warrant arranger liability.

ii.

"ActualInvolvement" Approach: Alaska and
Texas State Courts

At least two state courts have articulated and adopted an "actual involvement" approach to arranger liability; however, one of
those decisions has been overruled. 153 In R.R. Street & Co. Inc. v.
Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc. (Street J),154 the Court of Appeals of Texas,
First District, ruled that under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act
(TSWDA), 1 5 a supplier was subject to arranger liability when he
rendered technical advice to his client.1 5 6 There, a dry-cleaning
company (Pilgrim) relied on the advice of its equipment supplier
(Street) when disposing of PCE.1 5 7 The court reasoned that
Street's instruction to Pilgrim to "dispose of the separator water in
[a hazardous] manner, [showed Street] had some actual involvement in the decision to dispose of the waste, and gave such advice
for the purpose of disposing of the waste.115 8 The Alaska Supreme
Court adopted this approach in Berg .159
The Supreme Court of Texas, however, overturned Street I on
appeal. 160 In R. Street & Co. v. PilgrimEnterprises, Inc. (Street I1),161
the Supreme Court of Texas held that an equipment and chemical
supplier who gave advice to its client concerning waste disposal was
not an arranger under the TSWTDA.1 62 The court cited Edward
150. See id. at 1056 (distinguishing facts of Aceto from Shell Oil).

151. See id. at 1055 (emphasizing control as an important factor).
152. See id. at 1057. The United States was responsible, however, for 100% of
the clean up costs for the benzol waste. See id. at 1061-62.
153. See Berg I, 113 P.3d 604, 610 (Alaska 2005) (adopting Street Iapproach);
RR Street & Co., Inc. v. PilgrimEnters., Inc., 81 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App. 2001) (Street
1), rev'd, 166 S.W.3d 232, 255 (Tex. 2005) (Street I1).
154. 81 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App. 2001).
155. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.001 et seq. (Vernon 2001). The
TSWDA is the Texas counterpart to RCRA and CERCLA. See Street II, 166 S.W.3d at
238 (providing background).
156. See Street , 81 S.W.3d at 294-95 (stating holding of case).
157. See id. at 284-85 (discussing facts of case).
158. See id. at 295 (offering reasoning behind holding).
159. See Berg I, 113 P.3d 604, 611 (Alaska 2005) (adopting Street Iapproach).
160. See Street I, 166 S.W.3d at 255 (providing conclusion of case).
161. 166 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2005).
162. See id. at 235 (stating holding of case).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol17/iss2/6

18

Stevenson: Broadening Arranger Liability Under Alaska State Law: The Ninth C
2006]

BROADENING ARRANGER LiABiLiTY

Hines as a case with similar facts. 163 The court emphasized it was
significant that Street did not have actual control over the manner
in which Pilgrim disposed of the PCE.164 While "presence of authority to make disposal decisions is not necessarily a prerequisite
for arranger status," it is vital when arranger liability turns on "mere
1 65
advice regarding disposal that another party is free to ignore.
Thus, the court ruled that Street was no longer subject to potential
166
arranger liability, but remanded the case on other grounds.
b.

Useful Product Exception

Federal courts hesitate to assign arranger liability to persons
who sell a useful, but nonetheless hazardous product, to an end
user pursuant to the useful product exception. 16 7 Following this
doctrine in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Co. (Florida
Power),'1 68 the Eleventh Circuit held the mere sale of a hazardous
substance by a manufacturer, without further evidence of arranging
disposal, does not give rise to arranger liability under CERCLA section 9607.169
In Florida Power, manufacturers of electrical transformers containing a hazardous substance were not subject to arranger liability
when they sold the transformers to Florida Power & Light Company, which in turn sold them to a scrap yard. 170 The Eleventh
Circuit did not impose arranger liability on the manufacturers because Florida Power and the scrap yard did not present evidence
that the manufacturers intended to dispose of the hazardous waste
as part of the sale. 17 1 Thus, while a manufacturer can be subject to

163. See id. at 245 (noting factual similarities between Edward Hines and Street
cases).
164. See id. at 246 (providing rationale behind holding).
165. See id. (explaining importance of authority in determining arranger
liability).
166. See Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 255 (reiterating court's final determination).
167. See Berg I, 113 P.3d 604, 611 (Alaska 2005) (explaining useful product
exception as applied to arranger liability).
168. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
169. See id. at 1317-18 (discussing responsibility for cleanup of hazardous
waste). The court noted that to impose liability on a manufacturer who "does not
make the critical decisions as to how, when, and by whom a hazardous substance is
to be disposed . . .the evidence must indicate that the manufacturer is the party
responsible for 'otherwise arranging' for the disposal of the hazardous substance."
See id. at 1318.
170. See id. at 1315 (providing facts of case).
171. See id. at 1319 (noting insufficient evidence as basis for decision).
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arranger liability, to be so it must do more than merely sell a prod17 2
uct containing a hazardous substance to an end user.
A California district court followed the FloridaPower reasoning
in City of Merced v. Fields (City of Merced). 173 There, the City of
Merced discovered PCE in the groundwater, which was later traced
back to dry-cleaning facilities. 174 The defendant sought contribution from the PCE manufacturers, but the court did not find
enough evidence to rule either way on the manufacturers' involvement in the PCE disposal.' 75 Instead, the court inferred that the
mere sale of PCE, without more, would not subject the manufactur176
ers to arranger liability under CERCLA.
Courts often consider intent when determining whether to
grant the useful product exception to arranger liability. 177 For example, in New York v. Solvent Chemical Company, Co. (Solvent Chemical) ,178 a federal district court in New York held useful products are
not waste and therefore are not subject to arranger liability under
CERCLA. 179 The court noted a party's intent to "get rid of" a product was a major factor in determining whether to classify the product as useful. 8 0
In Solvent Chemical, the State of New York sought from the defendant (Solvent) recovery of cleanup costs from Solvent's chemical manufacturing plant.18 1 Solvent then sought third party
contribution under CERCLA section 9607(a) from those who sold
Solvent the zinc wastes at issue.' 8 2 The court determined that the
manufacturers' sale of zinc was useful to Solvent based on Solvent's
repeated purchase of the material, as well as zinc's marketability,
consumer demand and functionality as a raw material in Solvent's
172. See id. at 1318 (noting CERCLA's "broad remedial nature").
173. 997 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (following Fla. Power).
174. See id. at 1329 (providing facts of case).
175. See id. at 1332 (noting insufficient discovery rendered issue irresolvable
on motion to dismiss).
176. See id. The Ninth Circuit and others have "held that a manufacturer who
does nothing more than sell a useful, albeit hazardous product to an end user has
neither generated, transported, nor arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste
for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. [section] 9607(a)." See id.
177. See Berg I, 113 P.3d 604, 611 (Alaska 2005) (discussing "standards" of
useful product exception). The court noted "[tlhe key inquiry is often whether
the alleged arranger's intent was to dispose of waste or sell a product." See id.
(citing New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 270, 281-82 (W.D.N.Y. 2002);
Fa.Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Co., 893 F.2d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 1990)).
178. 225 F. Supp. 2d 270 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
179. See id. at 281 (citation omitted) (noting useful product is not waste).
180. See id. at 282 (explaining aspect of useful product defense).
181. See id. at 272-73 (providing facts of case).
182. See id. at 273 (describing procedural posture of case).
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production process.18 3 The court concluded zinc was a useful product, deflecting any arranger liability away from the manufac18 4
turers.
In sum, courts have taken two broad approaches to arranger
liability based on a PRP's intentions for, or control over or involvement in disposal.' 8 5 Within these broad approaches, courts have
engaged in five more specific lines of inquiry, including: strict liability; specific intent; totality of circumstances; obligation to control;

and actual involvement.18 6 Finally, the useful product exception
shields manufacturers who sell a useful, but harmful, substance to
87
an end user.'
B.

Alaska Statute

While the Alaska Statute is similar to CERCLA, arranger liability is broader under the former.18 8 The Alaska State Legislature
generally based its arranger liability statute on CERCLA.18 9 The
Alaska Statute, however, contains additional text, resulting in
nearly, but not totally, identical arranger liability provisions.ioo
The Alaska Statute does not define the term "arrange for;"
however, it is evident that in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil
spill, the Alaska Legislature sought to expand state arranger liability
beyond CERCLA's standards. 191 This expanded liability has the potential to attach to persons "merely responsible for managing or
handling a hazardous substance.., even after the substance has left

183. See Solvent Chem., 225 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83 (noting factors court considered in determining applicability of useful product exception).
184. See id. at 291 (providing holding of case).
185. See supra notes 72-166 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 189-93, 223-35 and accompanying text.
189. See Berg I, 113 P.3d 604, 607 (Alaska 2005) (discussing background of
Alaska Statute). While it was the Alaska Legislature's intent for CERCLA to act as a
framework for interpreting the Alaska Statute, federal law does not control a state's
interpretation of its own laws. See id. at 608 (citing Bill Review Letter from Douglas
B. Baily, Attorney General, to Governor Steve Cowper on H.B. 68 (May 11, 1989),
in Alaska State Archives, Series 1185, Record Group 91, Box No. 7892, File No.
883-89-0039) [hereinafter Bill Review Letter] (finding support for fact that federal
law does not control decision interpreting state statute).
190. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 607-08 (noting Alaska Statute includes "or" before
"by any other party or entity"). For a discussion of the Alaska Statute's language,
see supra note 6.
191. See Berg , 113 P.3d at 609 (citing Bill Review Letter, supra note 189).
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their control." 192 Thus, arranger liability under the Alaska Statute
193
has a broader reach than it does under CERCIA.
C.

Certified Questions

Under Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme
Court of Alaska is permitted to answer certified questions from the
United States Supreme Court, as well as federal district, appellate
or bankruptcy courts. 194 The Alaska Supreme Court must "stand in
the shoes of the certifying court" but employ its own judgment in
determining the law. 19 5 Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court must rely
on "precedent, reason, and policy" in answering certified
questions.196

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit's task in Berg II was to determine whether
defendant Maytag was subject to arranger liability under Alaska
law. 19 7 The court held that it was, which broadened Alaska's standard of arranger liability beyond CERCLA. 198 To make this determination, the Ninth Circuit relied on answers to two certified
192. See id. (citing Testimony on H.B. 68: Hearing on H.B. 68 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 16th Leg., (May 2, 1989)) (statement of Dennis Kelso, Commissioner of Department of Environmental Conservation) [hereinafter Testimony].
193. See Berg , 113 P.3d at 608 (noting broader standard of arranger liability
in Alaska).
194. SeeALAsKA R. App. P. 407(a) (stating rule of certification to state supreme
court). The rule dictates:
The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States,
a United States district court, a United States bankruptcy court or United
States bankruptcy appellate panel, when requested by the certifying court
if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this
state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court of this state.
See id.
195. See Berg , 113 P.3d at 607 (quoting FDIC v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 21 P.3d
344, 346 (Alaska 2001)) (noting Alaska procedure for answering certified
questions).
196. See id. (citing Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 165 (Alaska 2002))
(giving court's approach to answering certified questions).
197. See Berg II, 412 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting novelty of issue
whether entity is subject to liability under Alaska Statute when it manufactures or
sells useful product that, when installed by manufacturer and properly used, releases hazardous substances).
198. See id. at 1130 (stating holding of case); id. at 1127 (quoting Berg I, 113
P.3d at 609) (noting broadening of Alaska Statute after Exxon Valdez oil spill).
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questions from the Alaska Supreme Court, and quoted heavily from
the Alaska Supreme Court's certification decision. 199
The Ninth Circuit initiated its opinion by outlining the procedural posture of the case. 20 0 The court then noted Alaska Statute
sections 46.03.822(a) and (j) impose strict liability on responsible
parties and enable those responsible to seek contribution from
third parties who may also be responsible for cleanup costs. 20 1 The

court compared the language of Alaska Statute section
46.03.822 (a) (4) to the language of CERCLA section 9607(a) (3), as
both address arranger liability. 20 2 The distinction between the two

provisions is that the Alaska Statute includes the word "or" before
the phrase "by any other party or entity."2 0 3 This broadens the state
legislation beyond its federal counterpart by creating an additional
20 4
class of arrangers.
In their second amended complaint, the Bergs alleged that
Norge installed the dry-cleaning equipment and water separation
system that, even while used as directed, spilled PCE into the
nearby sewer system. 20 5 The Bergs further maintained that these
facts sufficiently stated a claim for arranger liability under the
20 6
Alaska Statute.
199. See id. at 1123-29 (relying on Alaska Supreme Court's interpretation and
reasoning). For a discussion of the procedural posture, see infra note 200.
200. See id. at 1123 (providing procedural background). The Bergs first filed
suit in Alaska state court under both CERCLA and Alaska state law, and Maytag
removed to federal district court pursuant to Tide 28 United States Code section
1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and section 1332(a) (diversity jurisdiction).
See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 607; Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1124 n.1. The district court could
not determine whether the parties were diverse, but concluded it had jurisdiction
due to the Bergs' federal question. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1124 n.1. In district
court, Maytag moved to dismiss the Bergs' second amended complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (6), and the district court did so, dismissing both the federal CERCLA and Alaska state claims. See id.; Berg I, 113 P.3d at 607. The Bergs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district court's dismissal of the Alaska
state claim. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 607. Because there was no ruling precedent on
Alaska's definition of "arranger liability," the Ninth Circuit sent two certified questions to the Alaska Supreme Court for clarification of state law. See Berg II, 412 F.3d
at 1126.
201. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (a) (4) (2004) (stating law regarding strict
liability standard for release of hazardous substances); id. § 46.03.822(j) (containing contribution provision).
202. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1126 (contrasting parallel Alaska and CERCLA
provisions). For the text of these statutes, see supra note 6.
203. See Berg Il,412 F.3d at 1126 (noting CERCLA omits "or" in its construction); id. at 1127 (quoting Berg I, 113 P.3d at 609) (noting broadening of Alaska
Statute after Exxon Valdez oil spill). See supra note 6.
204. See id. at 1126-27 (noting expanded liability).
205. See id. at 1126 (referring to Bergs' second amended complaint).
206. See id. (discussing Bergs' argument).
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The Ninth Circuit noted it had never imposed arranger liability on an entity that did not own or possess or have "'authority to
20 7
control or duty to dispose of" the relevant hazardous material.
Maytag asserted that because the Bergs did not allege Maytag
owned or possessed the hazardous substance, it could not be held
liable as an arranger. 20 8 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
there was no controlling precedent defining "arranger" under

Alaska state law, and thus certified two questions to the Alaska Su20 9
preme Court for review.
A. Alaska Supreme Court's Analysis
In Berg I, the Alaska Supreme Court accepted the Ninth Circuit's two certified questions and answered them in turn. 210 In answering the first certified question, the Alaska Supreme Court
adopted an actual involvement approach to arranger liability, which
broadened Alaska's arranger liability standard. 211 The court then
declined to apply the useful product exception to the facts in Berg
/.212

1.

No Requirement of Possession

The first certified question posed by the Ninth Circuit was
whether, under Alaska law, an entity must "own, possess, 'have authority to control,' or 'have a duty to dispose of'" the released hazardous substance before being subject to arranger liability, as it
would be under CERCLA. 2 13 The Alaska Supreme Court relied on
the statutory construction of both CERCLA and the Alaska Statute,
Alaska's legislative intent, and persuasive out-of-state case law in an21 4
swering the first certified question negatively.
The Bergs argued the inclusion of the word "or" in the state
provision broadened the scope of Alaska's arranger liability by ad207. See id. (quoting United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.
2002)) (referencing prior holdings).
208. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1126 (noting Maytag's contention that it was not
liable as arranger).
209. See id. (describing why Ninth Circuit certified two questions to Alaska
Supreme Court).
210. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d 604, 605 (Alaska 2005) (introducing certified questions sent from Ninth Circuit).
211. See id. at 610 (applying broadened standard).
212. See id. at 612 (recognizing but declining to apply useful product ex-

ception).
213. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1126 (presenting certified questions).
214. See id. at 1127-28 (citing Berg I, 113 P.3d at 608-12) (noting Alaska Su-

preme Court's analytical steps).
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ding another class of arrangers. 2 15 By contrast, Maytag argued the
inclusion of the word "or" was a result of "sloppy drafting." 216 The
court understood Maytag's argument as an implication that the
2 17
court should interpret the state law as consistent with CERCLA.
Because CERCLA was the intended framework for interpreting the
Alaska Statute, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to federal caselaw
2 18
for initial guidance.
The Alaska Supreme Court noted that federal courts have outlined general rules for interpreting arranger liability.2 19 These
rules encourage courts to interpret CERCLA broadly and to consider the specific facts of each individual case. 220 The Alaska Supreme Court, however, noted that relevant federal cases lacked fact
patterns analogous to Berg/.221 Finding no strong support from
federal caselaw, the Alaska Supreme Court turned to the text and
legislative history of the Alaska Statute and CERCLA. 2 22
Citing Alaska's legislative history, the Alaska Supreme Court
noted that CERCLA is a general framework for interpreting the
Alaska Statute. 22 3 The Alaska Supreme Court also noted differences between the two pieces of legislation. 224 Most notably, CERCLA contains four classes of PRPs whereas the Alaska Statute
contains five. 22 5 More specifically, while both CERCLA and the
Alaska Statute indicate arrangers of hazardous waste disposal can be

liable, the state legislation also considers those who own or have
215. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 608 (noting Bergs' contended interpretation).
216. See id. (describing Maytag's contentions).
217. See id. (explaining each side's argument).
218. See id. (citing Bill Review Letter, supra note 189) (noting next step in
analysis).
219. See id. at 608 (citations omitted) (explaining liberal interpretation of arranger liability in federal courts).
220. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 608 (noting general rules of interpretation).
221. See id. at 608-09 & nn.20-21 (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d
1045 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir.
1996); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988)) (noting dissimilarity between facts of Berg I and federal cases). For a discussion of these cases and others,
see supra notes 82-152 and accompanying text.
222. See id. at 609 (paying special attention to Alaska Statute and its legislative
history).
223. See Berg II, 412 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) (referring to Bill Review
Letter, supra note 189, noting initial framework for analysis).
224. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 607 (noting differences between Alaska Statute and
CERCLA).
225. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1127 (citing Berg I, 113 P.3d at 608) (noting differences between Alaska Statute and CERCLA).
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control over a substance at the time it is released PRPs. 226 In other

words, the Alaska Statute differentiates between those who arrange
for the disposalof a hazardous substance and those who own or control
a hazardous substance when it is released.
Principles of Alaska statutory construction prevented the court
from rendering this fifth class of PRPs superfluous. 227 The Alaska
Supreme Court noted prior precedent prohibited it from "'interpreting a statute in a manner that render[ed] other provisions
meaningless,"' thus giving weight' to all sub-clauses in the Alaska
Statute.2 28 The court emphasized the importance of the fifth class
of PRPs to show how the Alaska Legislature intended its law to
2 29
reach beyond CERCLA.
The Alaska Supreme Court found support for its reading of the
statute in the provision's legislative history.23 0 The Alaska Statute

was based on CERCLA generally, but following the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, the State Legislature revised section 822, broadening it beyond its federal counterpart. 23 1 Realizing the fragility of the state's
environment, Alaska legislators sought greater contribution from
23 2
parties responsible for hazardous spills.

Based on its reading of the state statute and the relevant legislative intent, the Alaska Supreme Court endorsed a standard of arranger liability that was broader than the Ninth Circuit's. 23 3 The
court held, in agreement with most courts that have considered and
assigned arranger liability, that the party arranging for disposal
must have some "'actual involvement in the decision to dispose of
waste. "'234 The court further held that actual involvement in disposal may include deciding how to dispose of waste, which can consist
226. See Berg I,113 P.3d at 609 (noting broader scope of Alaska Statute); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) (explaining liability features); ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03. 822(a) (1) (2004) (describing strict liability). See supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text.
227. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 609 (noting Alaska statutory construction principles).
228. See id. (citation omitted) (noting inability to disregard sub-clauses as
redundant).
229. See id. (discussing fifth class of PRPs).
230. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 609 (citing Testimony, supra note 192) (noting desire to collect from responsible parties).
231. See id. (describing reasons for expansion).
232. See Testimony, supra note 192.
233. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 609 (noting broadened liability).
234. See id. at 610 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962
F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992)) (noting requirement of actual involvement in
disposal).
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of "actions such as designing, installing, or connecting a system that
235
disposes of waste on behalf of a third party."
The Alaska Supreme Court found support for this interpretation in Street I, the Texas state case with a similar fact pattern. 2 36
The Alaska Supreme Court analogized the facts of Street I to Berg I
and applied the Texas appellate court's actual involvement standard because that standard was consistent with Alaska's legislative
intent in broadening the state's arranger liability provision. 237 The
238
court then addressed the second certified question.
2.

Useful Product Exception

Berg I was the first case where the Alaska Supreme Court considered the useful product exception, noting that federal courts apply the doctrine mostly "to shield suppliers of tangible physical
goods put to further productive use by their recipients." 239 The
court's consideration of the useful product exception was
prompted by the second certified question, which asked whether
one who lacks "ownership, possession, authority, or a duty to dispose can be liable for making, selling, or installing a useful product
that purposely directs hazardous substances into the environment."240 To answer the second certified question, the Alaska Supreme Court discussed cases construing the useful product
exception, which exempts the seller of a useful, but hazardous,
24 1
product to an end user from arranger liability under CERCLA.
For the useful product exception to apply, a seller's intent is key;
the court must determine whether the transaction is a sale or a dis242
posal tactic.
The Alaska Supreme Court noted both new and used hazardous substances can be exempted as useful products, provided they
235. See id. (clarifying holding).
236. See id. (noting similar fact pattern); see also Street I, 81 S.W.3d 276, 293
(Tex. App. 2001) (adopting actual involvement approach). See supra notes 153-66
and accompanying text.
237. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 612 (providing reasoning behind standard). For
a discussion of the facts of Street I, see supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
238. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 610.
239. See id. at 611-12 & n.45 (citations omitted) (offering reasoning behind
useful product exception).
240. See id. at 610 (addressing second certified question).
241. See Bergll,412 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting and citing Berg I,
113 P.3d at 611) (noting consistency with which federal courts have held that manufacturers who only sell useful product to end users have not arranged for hazardous substance disposal).
242. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 611 & n.41 (citations omitted) (noting factors
courts consider when granting useful product exception).
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are incorporated into other "downstream products" or "sold for reuse." 24 3 Referring to City of Merced, the court noted even the "distri-

bution" of a chemical that later harms the environment is different
2 44
from arranging for that substance's disposal.
Stating it had never before considered the useful product exception, the Alaska Supreme Court again looked to legislative intent. 245 Based on its reading of legislative testimony and a floor

memorandum, the court determined that Alaska intended to include a useful product exception into its legislation to keep insurance costs reasonable and not to deter commerce, especially from
2 46
hard to reach rural areas.
In its defense, Maytag cited several federal cases applying the
useful product exception.2 47 The court reasoned, however, that
these federal cases were inapposite to Berg I because the machine
Norge installed was used for disposal purposes and did not put a
useful, but hazardous, substance to further productive use. 2 48 In

other words, courts have not extended the useful product exception to entities whose "products or services were known to facilitate
another party's disposal" of hazardous substances, as Norge did in
Berg L249 The court declined to apply the useful product exception
in Berg I because the PCE-separator machine's primary function was
to facilitate the release of hazardous substances into the
250
environment.
Furthermore, the Alaska Supreme Court noted the state's useful product exception is narrower than CERCIA's. 25 1 Legislative
history shows that the Alaska Legislature sought to treat all "harmful substances" the same, while CERCLA implicitly distinguished be243. See id. at 611 (describing useful products).
244. See id. & n.37 (citing City of Merced v. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D.
Cal. 1998)) (noting mere sale of PCE was not enough to trigger arranger liability).
245. See id. at 611 (noting novelty of consideration).
246. See id. (citing Testimony, supra note 192). The Alaska Supreme Court also
cited a Floor Memo discussing the then-pending arranger liability provisions. See
Floor Memorandum from Alaska S. Judiciary Comm. on H.B. 68 (undated) (on
file with author and Alaska State Archives, Box No. 17568) [hereinafter Floor
Memo] (examining Alaska legislature's intent).
247. SeeBergI, 113 P.3d at 611-12 & n.45 (citing Ea. Power &Light, Co. v. Allis
Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990); City of Merced v. Fields, 997 F. Supp.
1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998); United States v. Consol. Rail Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Del.
1990)) (noting disposal as part of machines and services' "essential function [s]").
248. See id. at 611-12 (noting differences between federal cases and Berg 1).
249. See id. at 611 (declining to extend useful product exception).
250. See id. at 612 (noting essential function of machines).
251. See id. (citing Floor Memo, supra note 246) (discussing reasoning behind
useful product exception and Alaska's narrowed exception).
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tween wastes and useful substances. 252 Based on the Alaska
Statute's legislative history and unpersuasive federal case law, the

court concluded that the Alaska Statute will not protect a manufacturer, seller or installer of a useful product that intentionally directs
2 53
a hazardous substance into a public sewer.
B.

Ninth Circuit's Application of Alaska Supreme Court's
Interpretation

In Berg II, the Ninth Circuit applied Alaska law pursuant to the
254
Alaska Supreme Court's answers to the two certified questions.
The Ninth Circuit essentially recapitulated and affirmed the Alaska
Supreme Court's analysis and holdings in Berg I, thus vacating the
district court's holding that the Bergs' allegations insufficiently sup255
ported a claim for arranger liability under Alaska law.
Before reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning. 256 The Ninth Circuit first summarized the Alaska Supreme Court's reliance on legislative intent,
noting the Alaska Legislature intended CERCLA to be used as an
initial framework for interpretation. 25 7 The Ninth Circuit empha-

sized, however, that the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the
Alaska Statute to contain five classes of PRPs, as opposed to CERCLA's four. 258 The Ninth Circuit then quoted the Alaska Supreme

Court's Berg I opinion, remarking the Alaska Legislature intended
to expand arranger liability under the Alaska Statute after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 25 9 The Ninth Circuit then summarized the

Alaska Supreme Court's discussion of and reliance on Street I, remarking an entity's direct advice on disposal tactics sufficed as ac260
tual involvement in arranging for disposal.
252. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 612 (noting differences between CERCLA and
Alaska Statute). See also Floor Memo, supra note 246 (noting that "[w]hile CERCLA
was a useful model in conceptualizing the distinction between hazardous wastes
and useful hazardous substances, it went too far for [the Alaska Legislature's]
purposes").
253. See id. (declining to extend useful product exception).
254. See Berg II, 412 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (introducing case and
issues to be resolved).
255. See id. at 1130 (providing holding and issuing orders).
256. See id. at 1127 (noting lack of controlling precedent prompted court to

certify two questions to Alaska Supreme Court).
257. See id. (reviewing Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning).
258. See id. (noting statutory construction).
259. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1127 (noting expanded liability).
260. See id. at 1128 (discussing applicability of Street 1).
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Next, the Ninth Circuit turned to the second certified question. 26 1 The Ninth Circuit first addressed the Alaska Supreme
Court's discussion and rejection of the useful product exception in
262
Berg I, noting the "'alleged arranger's intent"' is a key inquiry.
The Ninth Circuit noted the Alaska Legislature's intent to include a
useful product exception to its CERCLA provision, but not when
the product or service at issue was specifically used to "facilitate another party's disposal of hazardous materials." 26 3 The Ninth Circuit
then applied to the facts the Alaska Supreme Court's answers to the
264
certified questions.
Applying the Alaska Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Alaska Statute, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Bergs alleged
facts sufficient to support a claim of arranger liability against Maytag under the Alaska Statute. 265 In their second amended complaint, the Bergs alleged that Norge recommended they use PCE,
that Norge designed and installed the dry-cleaning equipment and
that Norge installed the water-PCE separator system which directed
PCE into the public sewer. 266 The court accepted these allegations
as true and in the light most favorable to the Bergs. 267 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit found it was not beyond doubt that the Bergs could

"prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle
them to relief."2 68 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that under the
actual involvement approach adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court
(as articulated in Street 1), the Bergs alleged sufficient facts to state a

claim against Maytag as a PRP under Alaska's arranger liability
269
provision.

261. See id. at 1128-29 (noting each phase of Alaska Supreme Court's analysis).
262. See id. at 1128 (citations omitted) (discussing useful product exception).
263. See id. (noting rejection of exemption).
264. See Berg I, 412 F.3d at 1129 (applying law to facts of case).
265. See id. (giving holding of case).
266. See id. (summarizing Bergs' allegations).
267. See id. (noting court accepted allegations).
268. See id. (providing holding of case).
269. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1129 (providing holding of case). The Ninth Circuit did not disrupt the district court's findings on the issues of contribution, equitable apportionment, indemnity or sanctions against the Bergs' attorney. See id. at
1129-30.
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A.

CRITIcAL ANALYSIS

Was the Alaska Supreme Court Correct in Its Holding?

The Alaska Supreme Court correctly interpreted the Alaska
Statute as broader than CERCLA.2 70 Based on the Alaska Statute's
legislative history and the specific facts of Berg I, the Alaska Supreme Court reasonably adopted the actual involvement approach
27
to arranger liability. '
1.

Non-Requirement of Possession

In Berg I, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on state and federal
case law, statutory interpretation and legislative intent in holding
that one need not own, possess, have authority to control, or have a
duty to dispose of a hazardous substance to be potentially liable
under Alaska state law. 2 7 2 Due to the limited guidance of federal
caselaw, the court first compared the text of the Alaska Statute to its
federal counterpart, CERCLA, and then considered that text in
light of the provision's legislative history.2 73 This analysis resulted
274
in a reading of the Alaska Statute that is broader than CERCLA.
The Alaska Supreme Court correctly found that the federal
cases Maytag cited in its defense were insufficiently analogous to
the facts in Berg I and did not shield Maytag from potential liability. 2 7 5 The cases Maytag offered differ from Berg I and Berg II because in those federal cases, the alleged arranger was not actually
involved in the disposal process. 276 For example, in Iron Mountain,
the United States and California were not arrangers for constructing and managing the dams that caused the back up of pollutants
because the United States did not operate the dam, and neither the
2 77
United States nor California owned or possessed the mine waste.
270. See infra notes 271-309 and accompanying text.
271. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d 604, 610 (Alaska 2005) (applying actual involvement
standard articulated in Street 1).
272. See id. at 612 (summarizing answers to certified questions posed by Ninth
Circuit).
273. See id. at 608 (noting "statutory schemes" of CERCLA and Alaska Statute). While "federal case law interpreting a federal statute does not control [the
court's] decision in interpreting a state statute, the Alaska legislature intended that
CERCLA be used as a framework for interpreting section .822" of the Alaska Statute. See id. at 609.
274. See id. at 609 (relying on legislative intent).
275. See id. at 608-09 & n.21 (discussing relevant prior cases).
276. See BergI, 113 P.3d at 608-09 & n.21 (noting factual differences between
federal cases and Berg).
277. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1451-52 (E.D.
Cal. 1995) (declining to attach arranger liability for insufficient showing of ownership or possession of waste).
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In AAMCO, the oil companies were not arrangers because they did
not have sufficient ownership over the waste oil or control over the
waste oil process.2 78 Finally, in Edward Hines, a chemical treatment
equipment designer and installer was not an arranger when it did
not decide how the hazardous run off was to be disposed. 2 79 Therefore, the Alaska Supreme Court correctly differentiated the federal
cases Maytag offered in its defense and did not shield Maytag from
2 80
liability.
Current federal case law lacks a fact pattern analogous to Berg
I, which compelled the Alaska Supreme Court to examine the textual constructions of the Alaska Statute and CERCLA, as well as the
Alaska Statute's legislative background. 28' The Alaska Supreme
Court correctly noted that the word "or" in the Alaska Statute
should not be disregarded.2 82 The Alaska Supreme Court's reading
of the state's arranger liability provision is consistent with the state's
legislative intent, which called for a reading of the Alaska Statute
that is broader than CERCLA. 283 Alaska's natural resources are
vast, and the state's unspoiled landscape is important to its citizens
and legislature. 284 Hence, it was correct for the Alaska Supreme
Court to interpret its arranger liability statute with these considera28
tions in mind.

5

While the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a broader standard
of arranger liability than the Ninth Circuit, Alaska did follow a majority of courts by mandating that an arranger have some involvement in the disposal decision. 28 6 In Alaska, this involvement can
consist of deciding how to dispose of waste, which may include designing, installing or connecting a disposal system on behalf of a
third party.

28 7

278. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions,Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir.
1992) (noting arranger liability requires obligation to control waste).
279. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656
(N.D. Ill.
1988) (noting mere sale of waste was insufficient for arranger liability to
attach).
280. See Berg I,113 P.3d at 609-10 (noting differences between cases).
281. See id. at 609 (departing from case analysis).
282. See id. (noting each statutory section must be addressed).
283. See id. at 609 & n.25 (citing Bill Review letter, supra note 189) (noting
Alaska intended its liability provisions to be more expansive than CERCLA after
Exxon Valdez oil spill).
284. See, e.g., Alaska Department of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.state.
ak.us/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) (noting department's mission is to "develop, conserve and enhance natural resources for present and future Alaskans").
285. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 609 (noting legislative intent).
286. See id. at 609-10 (citation omitted) (noting importance of PRP's actual
involvement in determining arranger liability).
287. See id. (explaining broadened rule).
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Finding support in Street I, the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned
that actual involvement was an appropriate standard for arranger
liability, in light of the State Legislature's intent. 28 8 In Street I, Street

advised Pilgrim to flush the PCE-treated water into the sewer, just as
Norge "visited and inspected [Boni-Park] and provided service and
technical advice." 28 9 In both cases, the purchaser relied on its sup-

plier's disposal advice or services, resulting in a hazardous waste
spill. 290 Therefore, the Alaska Supreme Court appropriately analo291
gized the facts of Berg I to Street L
Although Street I, the most on-point case relied upon by the
Alaska Supreme Court in Berg I, has been overturned, Berg II is still

good law.29 2 The Texas Supreme Court in Street II overturned the

lower court's decision in part because it believed arranger liability
stemming from a chemical manufacturer providing technical service and advice would discourage those sellers from providing any
information at all to their clients. 2 93 The Alaska Supreme Court,

however, noted that the Alaska Legislature intended a broader
reading of arranger liability than CERCLA, while by contrast, the
Texas Supreme Court interpreted the TSWDA (on which arranger
liability is based in Texas) according to CERCIA and other federal
cases. 29 4 Specifically, while the Street II court's interpretation of the
TSWDA and CERCLA rendered Street not liable under arranger
theory, Alaska's broader reading is consistent with Alaska state
law.295

2.

Useful ProductException

Federal courts have found an entity can avoid arranger liability
when it merely sells a useful product to an end user. 296 Parties
288. See id. at 610 (adopting actual involvement approach).
289. See Street 1, 81 S.W.3d 276, 284-95 (Tex. App. 2001) (providing facts of
case); Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 606 (providing facts of case).
290. See StreetI,81 S.W.3d at 284, 295 (providing facts of case); BergI,113 P.3d
at 606 (providing facts of case).
291. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 610 (finding reasoning of Street Ipersuasive).
292. See Street II, 166 S.W.3d 232, 255 (Tex. 2005) (overturning Street 1).
293. See id. at 246 (noting argument chemical companies made in amicus
briefs).
294. See id. at 238-44 (noting how to interpret TSWDA). See also Eileen L.
McPhee, Comment, A Dirty Business: Arranger Liability Under the Texas Solid Waste
DisposalAct As It Relates to Dry Cleaning Chemicals, 7 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 391, 398,
404 (2006) (explaining Texas courts often look to federal courts' interpretation of
RCRA and CERCLA when interpreting TSWDA).
295. SeeBergII, 412 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Alaska Supreme
Court's reasoning).
296. See, e.g., Fla. Power &Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th
Cir. 1990); New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 270 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); City

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

33

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6

510 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. XVII: p. 477

avoiding liability in the useful product area usually sell a useful, but
hazardous, product to another entity, which in turn makes "further
productive use" of that product. 29 7 In Berg I, however, Norge provided equipment and services "specifically designed to release hazardous substances as part of their essential function." 2 98 This case
differs from FloridaPower, City ofMerced and Solvent Chemical because
in those cases, either the seller did not intend to dispose of the
substances as part of the sale, or the sale was a mere economic
299
transaction.
In Berg I, the essential functions of the machines and services
Norge provided the Bergs were dispositive. 300 In other words, the
Alaska Supreme Court correctly declined to apply the useful product exception to Maytag because the separator system's primary
function was to direct PCE-contaminated water into the sewer system, not to place the PCE back into a productive stream of
30 1
commerce.
Furthermore, legislative history indicates that Alaska's useful
product exception is narrower than CERCLA's. 30 2 While CERCLA
focuses only on "wastes," the Alaska Statute considers "'all harmful
substances the same."3°3 Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court properly did not apply the useful product exception to Norge's equip30 4
ment and services.
B.

Did the Ninth Circuit Properly Apply Alaska Law?

305
The Ninth Circuit correctly applied Alaska law in Berg I.
The Ninth Circuit certified two questions to the Alaska Supreme
Court because the matters of state law presented to the federal
court were novel. 30 6 When reviewing the answers to certified questions, a federal court is to rely on the state court's interpretation of

of Merced v. RA. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998)) (applying useful product exception).
297. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 611-12 (noting categories within useful product

exception).
298. See id. at 612 (declining to apply useful product exception).
299. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 168-84 and accompanying

text.
300. See Berg I, 113 P.3d at 612 (noting narrowness of useful product exception in Alaska).
301. See id. (discussing machines' essential disposal function).
302. See id. at 612 & nn.46-47 (citing legislative history).
303. See id. at 612 (distinguishing CERCLA from Alaska Statute).
304. See id. (declining to apply useful product exception).
305. See Berg II, 412 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Alaska law).

306. See id. at 1124 (noting why Ninth Circuit certified two questions to Alaska
Supreme Court).
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state law. 30 7 Relying on Alaska's interpretation of its arranger liabil-

ity provision, the Ninth Circuit found the Bergs' allegations were
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 30 8
Thus, the Ninth Circuit properly applied Alaska state law to the
state law questions.

30

9

VI.

IMPACT

Berg I and Berg H expand arranger liability in Alaska under the
state's version of CERCLA. 3 10 When faced with a similar question
of whether an entity is subject to arranger liability when it manufactures or sells a useful product that when used as designed and installed by the manufacturer, releases hazardous substances, an
Alaska state court must adhere to this reading of the state's arranger liability provisions. 31' Although a case the Alaska Supreme
Court used as a persuasive source has been overturned, Berg II re3 12
mains good law.

Interpreting arranger liability provisions has plagued both
state and federal courts for the past twenty-five years. 3 13 Without
any definitive guidance from the United States Supreme Court, federal courts may continue to diverge from each other in terms of
which arranger liability test to apply. 31 4 While not on the immedi-

ate horizon, it is time for the Supreme Court to make a final determination on the precise requirements for "arranger liability" under
CERCLA. 315 Doing so will benefit the environmental and business
307. See, e.g., Reinkemeyer v. SAFECO Ins. Co. of Am., 166 F.3d 982, 984 (9th
Cir. 1999) (declining to disregard Nevada Supreme Court's answer to certified
question of Nevada law). The Ninth Circuit notes it is "bound by the answers of
state supreme courts to certified questions just as [it is] bound by state supreme
court interpretations of state law in other contexts." See id. (citations omitted).
308. See Berg II, 412 F.3d at 1129 (providing holding of case).
309. See id. (applying Alaska law to facts).
310. See Berg 1, 113 P.3d at 609-10 (noting broadened reading of Alaska's arranger liability).
311. SeeBergll, 412 F.3d at 1124 (presenting question for Ninth Circuit's consideration). Although the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling, the question presented
was a matter of state law. See id.
312. At the time this Note went to press, Berg H had not been overruled.
313. See, e.g., Robins, supra note 2, at 189-90 (noting extensive litigation).
314. For a discussion of the various approaches courts take to arranger liability, see supra notes 72-166 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Lannetti, supra note 4, at 321 (suggesting Supreme Court determine scope of arranger liability). Some commentators suggest legislative clarification of arranger liability is necessary to avoid judicially active assignment of liability
"when none should exist." See Buboise, supra note 7, at 487 (arguing against 'Judicial expansion of arranger liability").
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communities by, among other things, establishing a consistent stan3 16
dard by which liability is measured.
In the meantime, state lawmakers should be encouraged to enact legislation inducing parties to preemptively reduce any inclina317
tion to dispose of hazardous wastes in an imprudent manner.
This is especially true considering CERCLA's taxing provision expired in 1995, and it does not seem as though the Bush Administration has its resuscitation high on the agenda. 3 18 Berg I and Berg II
are important cases because they stand for a broadening of environ3 19

mental liability.

Detractors cite reduced information sharing as a negative result of broader liability standards. 3 20 In cases such as Bergand Street,
where businesses relied on a supplier's disposal advice, critics claim
suppliers will withhold information altogether from their buyers to
avoid liability. 32 1 Industry efforts to recognize the companies tak-

ing initiatives to provide safe and environmentally sound alternatives can overcome this short-sighted response.322
316. See Lannetti, supra note 4, at 321. Lannetti notes: "A unified judicial in-

terpretation is necessary to assist those affected by CERCLA in taking prophylactic
measures to ensure compliance with the statute." See id.
317. See, e.g., Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global EnvironmentalProblems and the CriticalNeed to Develop SustainableDevelopment Programs at State and Local Levels In the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L &
POL'v, 175, 203-13 (1996) (noting legislative and regulatory roles state and local
governments should play in implementing sustainability initiatives). See also Ved P.
Nanda, Agriculture and the PolluterPays Principle,54 AM.J. CoMp. L. 317, 323 (2006)
(noting in addition to state CERCLA provisions, some state legislatures have enacted "polluter pays" legislation).
318. See Cartwright, supra note 5, at 315-18 (noting expiration of taxing mechanism and George W. Bush administration's announcement it would not seek
reauthorization). For a summary of early Bush administration environmental policies, see Douglas Jehl, On Environmental Rules, Bush Sees a Balance, Critics a Threat,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at Al (noting 2003 status of air, water, land, energy and
global climate policies).
319. See Berg II, 412 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing claim for
arranger liability under Alaska law).
320. See, e.g., Street II, 166 S.W. 3d 323, 246 (Tex. 2005) (providing reasons to
narrow liability).
321. See id. (discussing chilling effect broad arranger liability would have on
giving advice).
322. See, e.g., David W. Case, CorporateEnvironmentalReporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 379 passim (2005)
(arguing for mandatory informational disclosure in corporate environmental
realm); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in
Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. Rv. 97 passim (2000) (using
economic model to analyze whether incentives induce voluntary regulatory compliance and under which circumstances). See also Claudia H. Deutsch, The New
Black: Companies and Critics Try Collaboration,N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at GI (noting trend towards cooperation between environmentalists and corporations).
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There are also larger implications of stricter environmental
standards, affecting

our international

economy. 323

While the

United States has shifted from an industrial to a service and information-based economy, nations such as China are currently experiencing their own industrial booms. 324 The United States can
maintain its global leadership position only by providing responsible environmental models for others to follow. 3 25 On both micro

and macro levels, broadened liability may increase costs in the
short-run, but the failure to pay now will only injure global players
32 6
in the future.
Sarah E. Stevenson

323. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Go West, Old Men, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,

2006, at A19 (arguing China has much to learn from California's "strong energy
standards and supportive government policies to nurture the widespread deployment of clean technologies"). See also Meixian Li, Comment, China's Compliance
With WTO Requirements Will Improve the Efficiency and Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China, 18 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 155, 163 (2004) (arguing

accession into WTO and current legal transformation will enhance China's ability
to protect environment).
324. See Lester R. Brown, Lions, Tigers and Bears: China's Emerging Economy,
WEST By NORTHwEST.ORG, Feb. 16, 2005, http://westbynorthwest.org/artman/
publish/article_1020.shtml (noting China's surging consumption).
The World Bank has also invested resources in supporting environmental
management in China. See World Bank Group, Supporting Environmental Management in China, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,pagePK180619-theSitePK136917,00.html (follow "East Asia and the
Pacific" hyperlink; then select "Environment" under "Select a Topic" scroll; then
follow "China Environment" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 2, 2006) (providing information and resources on China's economy and its environmental impacts).
325. See Rice & Bracy, supra note 22 (emphasizing importance of U.S. environmental leadership). Rice and Bracey note: "The United States has a vital interest in leading international efforts to secure a sustainable global environment and
protect the United States and its citizens from the effects of environmental degradation." See id. See also Norbert Walter, An American Abdication, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2002, at A19. Walter notes: "at this very moment the most powerful country in
the world stands to forfeit much political capital, moral authority and international
good will by dragging its feet on the next great global issue: the environment." See
id.
326. See, e.g., Walter, supra note 325, at A19 (noting failure to act now puts
United States at risk of losing "moral and intellectual authority" as well as "strategic
advantages" it now holds).
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